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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze how gender affects women’s political participation. More specifically, we 
test the effect of gender ideology on young women’s participation in political consumerism. The 
current literature suggests different reasons to explain the gap in political participation between men 
and women, most importantly focusing on socio-economic resources, gender roles, and political 
socialization, whereas little attention has been devoted to the individual interpretation of a woman 
and man’s own role in society. We test the effects of gender ideology on political consumerism, a 
form in which women participate more than men. We analyze political consumerism among young 
urban women, the population most likely to hold an egalitarian gender ideology. Moreover, we 
compare young women with different job conditions. Although the gender gap is closing or reversing 
in regard to specific forms of participation, such as consumerism, some inequalities remain, and our 
study contributes to understanding differences in participation among women themselves.  
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Introduction 
Who participates in politics and what drives this participation are two central questions for democracy. They 
help us understand inequalities that constrain equal political participation by all citizens—that is, an equal 
chance of having one’s voices heard and of shaping political decisions. Inequalities that hinder political 
participation take multiple forms: they can be related to educational attainments, to job conditions, to 
income, or to socio-demographic characteristics such as age, ethnic background, or gender (Jacobs and 
Skocpol, 2005; Schlozman et al., 2005; Soss and Jacobs, 2009). In this paper, we are interested in the 
unequal participation of young women in political consumerism.  
Research on women’s political participation has long tried to explain the gender gap, which refers to 
women’s lower rate of participation in voting and in other political actions. However, the most recent 
research in this field shows that the gender gap is closing (Paxton et al., 2007; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; 
Burns et al., 2001; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010; Conway, 2000) or even reversing for some specific forms of 
participation, such as political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2005). The closing and the reversing of 
the gender gap opens avenues for new research focusing on differences in the political participation of 
women depending on their political resources, beliefs and attitudes. Following Nancy Burns (2005: 140, our 
emphasis), we contend that “[w]e have to theorize and model the ways gender works homogeneously and 
heterogeneously, not because heterogeneity is a goal in itself, but rather because we will get the story 
wrong if we focus solely on the things that all women or all men share.” Thus, focusing on political 
consumerism—a frequent mode of political participation among women, and one in which more than only 
the most educated and resourceful women participate (Stolle and Hooghe, 2011)— can help us unravel the 
reasons behind female participation or the lack thereof.  
This topic is a timely one, as espoused by Elizabeth Gidengil (2007) in her presidential address to the 
Canadian Political Science Association, because we know little about what drives differences in political 
participation—not only between men and women but also among women of different social classes, with 
different educational attainments, and with different political resources. Gender inequalities interact with 
other divisions in society that affect the likelihood of participating in politics—for instance, class and age 
inequalities. Because “the gender gaps in political participation have narrowed, disappeared or even 
reversed, what we really need to understand is why there are such differences among different groups of 
women” (Gidengil, 2007: 826-7).  
In this paper, we are interested in the main reason(s) for heterogeneous political participation among 
young women. Thus we consider, in particular, a post-materialistic argument related to gender ideology. We 
argue that the ways in which young women conceive of gender roles—what we term gender ideology—
contribute to their political participation. The reason to address the issue from the gender ideology 
perspective relates to the lack of a robust explanation regarding the diversity in terms of political 
participation found among women. “Controlling for a variety of relevant demographic characteristics and 
political attitudes did not impact gender gaps as much as might be expected based on theories of differential 
resources or gender role socialization” (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010: 331). Indeed, Diekman and Schneider 
(2010) stress the importance of considering potential variation in how the individuals understand their gender 
roles. Furthermore, we test potential variations of this effect across employment statuses.  
We find that gender ideology, which can be thought of as a continuum from more egalitarian to more 
traditional beliefs about women’s roles in both paid and care work, affects women’s political participation. 
Women who hold a more egalitarian gender ideology are more likely to participate, whereas more 
traditionally oriented women are less likely to do so. However, congruency between one’s employment 
status and one’s beliefs about women’s roles in society is required for gender ideology to foster political 
consumerism. Our study contributes to the understanding of differences in the political participation of 
young women by adding one possible mechanism through which gender may affect political participation—
namely, through beliefs about women’s and men’s roles in the family and in the labor market. 
In the remainder of the paper, we first introduce the main concepts and review the literature on the 
gender gap, on women’s political participation, and more specifically, on political consumerism. We then 
turn to the existing explanations of women’s political participation. Next, we discuss the concept of gender 
ideology, how it is shaped by lived experiences and how it contributes to the development of the hypotheses 
we propose to test. Then, we move to the empirical part of our research and present the interview data we use 
as well as the methods. Finally, we discuss the results of our analyses and the main findings of our research.  
 
Setting the framework 
In this section, we briefly introduce the key concepts of our paper and the key issue that we later 
develop in the literature review. The three main pieces composing our puzzle are the employment situation 
of the women under scrutiny and their gender ideology, along with the specific political mode of 
participation we are studying: consumerism.  
Research on women’s political participation shows that employment situation (Schlozman et al., 
1999; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006), family situation (Burns et al., 2001; Voorpostel and Coffé, 2010), and 
political socialization (Sapiro and Conover, 2001; Gidengil et al., 2010; Hooghe and Stolle, 2004a) all 
contribute to differences found between women’s and men’s political participation. Fewer studies address 
the effects of these elements on differences in political participation among women. Societal transformations 
resulted in increased participation of women in the labor force, women’s access to higher education, and 
female professional careers. Women’s participation in paid employment, in turn, transformed the political 
socialization of children (Sapiro, 2004). However, women are confronted with more or less opportunities of 
achieving high income and professional success depending on their sector of activity. In other words, women 
do not form a homogeneous social group, and therefore, it is relevant to explain variations in the political 
participation of women in relation to their professional status. Here, we propose to test whether gender 
ideology contributes to explaining differences among women’s participation in political consumerism 
depending on their employment situation.  
Gender ideology refers to beliefs about the division of paid and care work based on a gendered 
division of work between men (working outside the home to provide a living, the breadwinner) and women 
(working within the home to provide care and nurture the family) within heterosexual couples. Following 
Davis and Greenstein (2009: 89), gender ideology can be defined as “an individual’s level of support for a 
division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres”. Gender 
ideology is found to influence educational, professional, marital, and maternal choices (see Davis and 
Greenstein, 2009: for a review of the effects of gender ideology). Thus, it may also influence choices related 
to political participation. Indeed, politics, similar to full-time employment during most of the 20th century, is 
viewed as a man’s world and participation in it is shaped by gendered conceptions of women’s and men’s 
roles in society (see Lovenduski and Norris, 1993 ; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995: for a discussion of gender 
effects on party candidates for elections). Gender ideology shapes not only women’s employment but also 
their participation in politics. However, individuals can modify or contribute to shaping the adopted gender 
roles within and outside of the family (Diekman and Schneider, 2010). Moreover, professional and personal 
situations contribute to defining gender ideology throughout one’s life (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). Thus, 
employment and gender ideology influence each other.  
Egalitarian gender ideology may also be framed as a post-materialistic value (Inglehart, 1997; 
Inglehart and Norris, 2003) also for this reason it will favor women engagement in unconventional political 
actions. Among different possible behaviors of this kind, we focus on one form of political participation—
political consumerism, which is understood as the choice to buy or avoid consuming certain goods and 
services for political reasons. Political consumerism can be defined even more precisely as the “consumer 
choice of producers and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices” 
(Micheletti et al., 2004: xiv). We choose to focus on political consumerism based on previous findings 
showing that in this form of participation, women are even more active than men (Stolle and Micheletti, 
2005). This means that, in this form of participation, we have a greater chance of finding women with 
different profiles participating—in other words, not only the most educated and resourceful women engage 
in political consumerism. Thus, we test the effect of gender ideology in the form of political participation 
where we expect it to play a more determinant role given the presence of a wider set of women. Hence, we 
provide a reliable test of our hypothesis because the barrier for participating in this form is lower.  
The main argument of the paper is that young women who hold a gender ideology favoring equal 
involvement of women and men in paid employment and care work are more active in political consumerism 
than women holding more traditional views about gender roles. This is because women’s conception of 
equality between men and women also supports engagement in other domains of public life that are 
traditionally dominated by men. However, because gender ideology is shaped by lived experiences, we 
expect to find differences depending on the women’s employment status. In other words, we expect that 
employment status moderates the effects of gender ideology on political participation. Thus, we posit that 
gender ideology varies across employment statuses and contributes differently to the political participation of 
employed, precariously employed, and unemployed young women.  
We test this argument empirically with data on young women living in four European cities. The 
focus on urban youth provides us with more variety in terms of attitude towards gender, as the more 
progressive forces tend to live in urban contexts and gender ideologies favoring equality are also more 
widespread among younger women (Davis and Greenstein, 2009; Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2004). Moreover, 
the data offers a unique sample of unemployed, employed, and precariously employed young women to 
control for a differential effect of gender ideology depending on labor market status. Thus, these data allow 
us to test the effects of gender ideology on the political consumerism of young women who are involved in 
the labor market differently, thereby allowing us to consider the specific way in which gender develops and 
operates (Burns 2005).  
 
Transformations in women’s political participation  
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the literature on women’s political participation is interested in 
comparing women’s and men’s political participation and assessing differences in how much they 
participate, what is often referred to as the gender gap. Although we focus on a comparison of women only, 
we begin with a review of the existing findings on the gender gap in the Western world and its evolution.  
Recent research shows that differences in political participation between women and men vary 
across modes of participation (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010) and suggests that the gender gap is diminishing 
or even disappearing in certain modes. At the turn of the 21st century, the gender gap in the most common 
form of participation—namely, voting—is shrinking or even disappearing when compared to the 1960s or 
1970s (Paxton et al., 2007; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Burns et al., 2001; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). 
Similarly, Schussman and Soule’s (2005) work on protest activities in the U.S. found that women in the 
1990s were no longer less likely to engage in protest activities when considering a broad range of social 
movements. This is consistent with the findings of other research in the United States (Burns et al., 2001) 
and in Europe (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). However, with regard to other institutional political 
activities, particularly those associated with political parties, women remain less engaged than men 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Paxton et al., 2007). Generally, women are found to be less active in 
institutionalized modes of political participation and more active in non-institutionalized modes (Marien et 
al., 2010; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010); this is particularly true for younger women. It may be because they 
have a negative conception of institutional politics and tend to engage more in civic life (Taft, 2006; Taft, 
2014).  
Interestingly, research also highlights one form of participation in which women are more active than 
men. In political consumerism, researchers find that the gender gap is now reversed, favoring women (Stolle 
and Micheletti, 2005; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). Political consumerism refers to political actions taken 
through the consumption or avoidance of goods and services for political reasons. At the collective level, 
political consumerism mostly takes the form of boycott campaigns; at the individual level, citizens engage in 
it by buying or boycotting certain products for political reasons (Neilson, 2010; Hawkins, 2010; Dubuisson-
Quellier, 2013). There are also other consumerist phenomena, such as the refusal to consume or the free 
exchange of goods and services outside market structures. However, these are less common forms of 
consumerism and are far less studied (see for instance Conill et al., 2012; Albinsson and Yasanthi Perera, 
2012). To explain this reversed gender gap, the authors propose a number of explanations. The first relates to 
women’s higher involvement in shopping for the family. Although this might explain historical boycott 
campaigns that were often initiated and led by women, it does not account for the higher political 
consumerism found among female students in Belgium, Canada, and Sweden in the 2000s (Stolle and 
Micheletti, 2005). These authors instead contend that it is related to post-materialistic values and to other-
regarding preferences (caring for others’ well-being) that are both more common among women (Stolle and 
Micheletti, 2005). Furthermore, political consumerism is a form of everyday political participation that is 
non-institutionalized and requires limited resources (Stolle and Micheletti, 2005): it is non-institutionalized 
because it does not work along the rationale of the representative democracy, it requires little effort because 
it is imbued in the everyday life and implies a limited amount of time, energy, and money. Reflecting on the 
democratic aspect of “creative” forms of political participation, such as political consumerism, among others, 
van Deth (2012) argues that it is neither the form nor the domain of action that contributes to its definition as 
a political act, but rather the motives. For our concerns here, political consumerism can be considered as an 
act through which individuals pursue political goals (Micheletti, 2003). Indeed, the questions used to capture 
political consumerism clearly state that we are interested in practices of buying or refusing to buy products 
for political reasons. Thus, the individuals who answered positively give a political meaning to this action. 
 
Explaining women’s political participation 
In the literature on women’s political participation, two major explanations are used to account for the 
gender gap: 1) differences in terms of available resources and 2) differences in terms of political attitudes 
(for a discussion see Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2011; Engeli et al., 2006). The former considers explanations 
related to women’s participation in paid work in the labor market and unpaid care work within the family. It 
is related to the socio-economic status model (SES) and assesses the acquisition of resources that foster 
political participation. The main argument is that paid work sustains participation in politics through the 
acquisition of resources that foster political participation, whereas care work hinders political participation 
by limiting access to these resources—namely, time, money, civic skills, and access to networks (Schlozman 
et al., 1999; Schlozman et al., 1994; Verba et al., 1997; Schlozman et al., 1995).  
Schlozman et al. (1999) analyzed the determinants of women’s employment—the self-selection of 
women into the labor market at different professional levels—and its effects on political participation (as 
measured through an index). They show that, although the effects of single predictors of labor market 
participation and job levels contribute slightly to political participation, together they account for a 
significant share of the gender gap. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) show that participation in paid 
employment contributes to political participation not only by increasing resources (money) and inclusion in 
networks that support political participation, but also through its effects on how women and men share 
domestic work within the household. Moreover, Burns et al. (2001) found that the gendered division of 
domestic work does not hinder women’s political participation through its impact on resources. However, it 
affects women’s political participation through normative beliefs about gender equality, thus pointing to the 
importance of including gender ideology in explanations of women’s political participation. Finally, 
researchers working on biographical availability—that is, analyzing specific moments in life, such as 
entering the labor market, getting married or having children, that impact the availability of time for 
engagement in political activities (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006)— highlight contradictory effects of marital 
status on women’s political participation. More specifically, they show that depending on the form of 
political participation, civil status either fosters or hinders participation: divorce or separation reduces voting 
behavior (Voorpostel and Coffé, 2010) and fosters protest activities (Corrigall-Brown, 2012).  
There is also a competing explanation related to political attitudes. This latter explanation highlights 
differences in terms of attitudes towards politics and the role of political socialization, which results in 
women’s lower interest in and motivation to engage in politics (for a review see Sapiro, 2004). In this second 
strand of literature, research on political socialization discusses the role of political attitudes in explaining 
women’s political participation. A number of studies show that children’s and teenagers’ political 
socialization is not gender neutral (see Fridkin and Kenney, 2007: for a literature review). Differences appear 
in the acquisition of political views and their relationship to the political sphere between girls and boys 
(Andersen and Cook, 1985; Jennings, 1983; Paulsen, 1991). Working with teenagers, Hooghe and Stolle 
(2004b) demonstrate that 14-year-old girls take political activism into consideration as much as, or more 
than, boys of the same age when offered a wide variety of political activities. Girls favor those activities 
related to volunteering, whereas boys favor those related to party politics. This already reveals a gender gap 
in girls’ and boys’ anticipated modes of political participation. Fridkin and Kenney (2007) confirm that the 
political socialization of women during their childhoods is less supportive of their political engagement. 
Thus, young women perceive politics as a man’s world. Gidengil et al. (2010) find that women who report 
that their mothers were politically active are also more likely to engage in political activities and to score 
higher on political interest and efficacy. Furthermore, they establish that the effect of mothers as role models 
is stronger than that of subsequent socializing experiences, such as education or employment. Other studies 
support this argument by showing the importance of socialization in transmitting political attitudes, such as 
political interest and political efficacy (Gidengil and Stolle, 2012; Verba et al., 1997; Mayer and Schmidt, 
2004).  
When included in the same analysis, SES and political attitudes reveal different effects on different 
forms of participation. Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) find that, when controlling for political interest and 
political efficacy, women are significantly more likely to vote than men and that women are more active in 
consumer activities when including socio-economic and political attitude predictors. Overall, it appears that 
SES and biographical availability are more important in explaining institutional participation than in 
explaining political consumerism, whereas political attitudes contribute equally in predicting institutional 
and new forms of participation. However the two strands are not competing hypotheses but complementary 
determinants of political behaviors, which vary in strength according to specific targets, countries and 
behavior under scrutiny. For this reason, we propose to include in our model the two sets of predictors 
highlighted here—on the one hand, SES and biographical availability and, on the other, political attitudes—
as control variables when testing the effects of gender ideology. 
 
 Adding gender ideology to explain women’s political consumerism 
Gender ideology is a set of beliefs about women’s involvement in different sex roles or life spheres, such as 
the professional and the familial (see Davis and Greenstein, 2009: for a literature review). One’s gender 
ideology can be more egalitarian or more traditional depending on one’s views about female involvement in 
different life spheres that are deemed more or less “masculine” domains. We consider that an egalitarian 
gender ideology entails support for similar involvement of both women and men in any sphere of life, be it 
public or private, whereas persons holding a more traditional gender ideology would expect different 
commitments of women and men in the family and in paid work, for instance.  
Gender ideology is widely studied to explain how various choices in women’s lives are affected by 
beliefs about gender (see Davis and Greenstein, 2009: for a literature review). Studies show that gender 
ideology contributes to choices in terms of education (Davis and Pearce, 2007) and employment (Corrigall 
and Konrad, 2007) as well as marriage (Vespa, 2009) or maternity and housework (Carlson and Lynch, 
2013; Greenstein, 1996). Because gender ideology shapes both professional and personal choices, we expect 
that it also contributes to political choices and to participation in political consumerism. In fact, gender 
ideology is found to have effects on politics as well. Paxton and Kunovich (2003) show that gender ideology 
affects the probability of electing a female. Traditional ideology affects both the electoral choice (citizens not 
voting for women) and the selection of candidates (women not running for election). However, to the best of 
our knowledge, no study has addressed the effects of gender ideology on other forms of political 
participation.  
Furthermore, research has considered the determinants of gender ideology to understand what leads 
women and men to be more or less egalitarian (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Corrigall and Konrad, 2007; 
Kroska and Elman, 2009). The most important explanations of gender ideology are interest-based and 
exposure-based (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). First, the interest-based explanation is related to the idea that 
people have different interests and that these interests, in turn, explain differences in support for gender 
equality. Mostly, this serves to explain women’s higher commitment to gender equality because they are the 
main beneficiaries of changes in society favoring a more equal division of work, status, and rights between 
men and women. Second, the exposure-based explanation explains how education, socialization, and 
personal experiences all contribute to the construction of specific beliefs about gender roles. The general idea 
is that when exposed to a situation implying more equality, people become more egalitarian. For instance, in 
the labor market, women are in contact with other working women. This enhances their support for women’s 
employment and for an equal division of work between men and women. Gender ideology is constructed 
through a dynamic process and may change over time. Indeed, the idea of exposure is that the specific 
situation one experiences in shapes her views about gender roles. This would also imply reverse causation in 
which women select to be exposed to those inputs reinforcing their own beliefs. Thus, the exposure argument 
predicts that the more a woman is involved in paid work, the more she will support an equal division of 
work. On the contrary, the more she is involved in family and care work, the more she will support a 
traditional division of work. Interestingly, Davis (2007) shows that lived experiences are more important 
than social background in explaining young adults’ gender ideology. The construction and re-construction of 
one’s beliefs about women’s and men’s role in the public and the private spheres over time is related to one’s 
personal experience in terms of employment, marriage, and children. 
We are especially interested in variations in terms of gender ideology that are related to one’s current 
employment situation: being long-term unemployed, precariously employed, or regularly employed at the 
time of the interview. The expectations that can be derived from interest- and exposure-based explanations in 
relation to employment partly overlap. It is difficult to untangle whether employment fosters egalitarian 
views because of interest, defending one’s position in the labor market, or due to exposure to feminist or 
anti-discrimination views and conciliation practices (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004: 763). Nevertheless, 
specific events in the life course shape gender beliefs. For instance, Corrigall and Konrad (2007) find that 
women who have had their first child reduce their support for gender egalitarianism. More interesting for us 
here, Kroska and Elman (2009) show that women who start to work or increase their paid work become more 
supportive of mothers’ involvement in the labor market. They refer to this mechanism as the control 
hypothesis, stating that individuals will adapt their views about gender equality to their current situation to 
reduce inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviors (Kroska and Elman, 2009).  
This is also in line with research discussing women’s engagement in the private sphere in domestic 
and care work as an alternative to unemployment, particularly during long-lasting periods of joblessness. 
Studies highlight that, for women, the boundaries between inactivity and unemployment are fuzzy (Maruani, 
2004); female unemployment tends to be underestimated (Maruani, 2002; Davies and Esseveld, 1982), and 
these studies show that women’s unemployment is less recognized due to the idea that women can invest 
their time and energy in the private sphere when they do not have a paid job (Maruani, 2001; Bachmann et 
al., 2003). Hence, the assignment of women to the private sphere blurs the boundaries of unemployment. 
Does it also offer alternative (valued) identities to unemployed women? Davies and Esseveld (1982) explain 
that investment in domestic and care work does not replace paid employment and commitment to it. 
However, it may moderate the negative consequences of unemployment by offering alternative activities and 
a valued identity. Following this line of thought, unemployed women may reduce their support for female 
involvement in paid work and also decrease their support for women who work when they have young 
children in an attempt to increase the consistency between their current employment status and their beliefs 
about gender roles.  
Based on the gender ideology theory, we expect that young women who hold more feminist and 
egalitarian views will be more likely to participate in political consumerism because, in their conception of 
gender roles, political participation is equally a man’s and a woman’s business (hypothesis 1). This is also in 
line with post-modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997) suggesting people with post-materialistic stance are 
more prone to unconventional political behavior as compared to more traditionalist people. We expect that 
this effect will be robust and hold when controlling for the main predictors of political participation 
stemming from the literature on the gender gap, such as SES (Verba et al., 1995), political attitudes 
(Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Verba et al., 1995), and biographical availability (Corrigall-Brown, 2012). It is 
important to note here that some of these controls are also predictors of gender ideology, in particular those 
related to SES and biographical availability (education, employment, family situation), and they may wash 
out the effects of gender ideology.  
Furthermore, we propose to investigate differences across employment statuses. Following the SES 
model, we expect long-term unemployed women to have a lower rate of participation than regular workers. 
As for precarious youth, Bassoli and Monticelli (2011) suggest that their participation vary according to the 
type of political action. While in conventional political behaviors precarious are more active, in 
unconventional ones they are as active as regular workers. Hence, precarious women’s rate of participation 
should be analogous to regular workers in political consumerism. However rather than focusing on job 
condition only, we are interested in the interaction with gender ideology.  More specifically, we anticipate 
that long-term unemployed women will hold less egalitarian gender beliefs to reduce discrepancies with their 
personal situations of joblessness. Both the exposure-based explanation and the control hypothesis point to 
the importance of the current employment situation for gender ideology. 1 Due to their less egalitarian gender 
beliefs and their labor condition, we expect that the long-term unemployed young women participate less in 
political consumerism (hypothesis 2a). The theories used to define our hypotheses do not allow us to predict 
what will happen for those women who have incongruent gender beliefs and employment status. Thus, we do 
not formulate a hypothesis on the effect of an increase in egalitarian beliefs for young unemployed women. 
Finally, precarious workers move in and out of the labor market. Thus, we expect to observe a similar effect 
of gender ideology for the regularly and the precariously employed young women (hypothesis 2b). 
 
Data and methods 
We use a unique dataset collected within the framework of a European research project on Youth, 
Unemployment, and Exclusion (YOUNEX). This dataset allows us to study urban young women and to 
compare the effects of gender ideology across employment statuses. In fact, the respondents are all living in 
a city and are 18 to 34 years old. The four cities, Geneva (Switzerland), Turin (Italy), Cologne (Germany), 
and Lyon (France), represent different welfare regimes. Selecting urban young women allows us to work 
with young women who are exposed to egalitarian gender models. 
The data is derived from computer-assisted telephone interviews conducted in four European cities 
on representative samples of long-term unemployed youth (301 in Geneva, 480 in Turin, 329 in Cologne, 
and 406 in Lyon), precariously employed youth (250, 480, 411, and 410, respectively), and a control group 
of regularly employed youth (317, 484, 407, and 395). Long-term unemployment is defined as having been 
without a job for at least one year, whereas regularly employed youth are defined as having had an open-
ended contract for at least one year, and precariously employed youth are those who have had multiple fixed-
end contracts and move in and out of the labor market. The fieldwork was conducted between 2009 and 
2010. The project website provides both the full questionnaire (YOUNEX, 2009) and any other information 
about national survey (YOUNEX, 2012).  
The dependent variable is political consumerism, which includes boycotting or buying products for 
political reasons. Using these two measures of political consumerism is a standard practice in the study of 
political consumerism, as few additional items measuring it are available (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). We 
constructed a dichotomous variable coded as one when the respondent took part in either one of the 
activities, or in both activities, during the last 12 months and zero otherwise. Descriptive statistics (mean and 
standard deviation) of political consumerism are presented in Appendix 1 by employment status, along with 
all independent variables. 
The first model assesses the impact of gender ideology on political consumerism. We use one 
independent variable that measure gender ideology. We construct an index with two continuous variables 
measuring views about women’s and men’s roles in the labor market and in the household. Two questions 
were asked to measure agreement with the situation of, respectively women and men working full-time while 
having children under three years old, 2 this corresponds to common measures of gender ideology (see Davis 
and Greenstein, 2009: for a discussion of these measures). The first question measures agreement with 
statements considering women’s relationship to children while working. It assesses more 
egalitarian/traditional stances toward women’s role in the private and public spheres. Although gender 
equality currently finds more support, female participation in the workforce while having children remains a 
central component of gender ideology and egalitarian beliefs. Thus, the first question measuring “support for 
female full-time employment while having young children” already captures a more egalitarian gender 
ideology because respondents who agree with it conceive that women can work full-time if they want to, 
even when they have young children. In addition the second question measures agreement with more 
traditional conceptions of the main breadwinner in the family. Men’s full-time employment while having 
children is questioned less often and remains the most common division of work among heterosexual 
families. Our second question, “support for male full-time employment while having young children”, 
measures agreement with a full-time working father. It is a measure of agreement with the traditional 
breadwinner model and captures a more traditional gender ideology translated into support for the traditional 
division of paid and care work between women and men. Yet, in isolation none of these two measures can 
capture one’s gender ideology in relation to the conciliation of employment and care. In order to do so, we 
need to compare support for female and for male full-time work while having young children. Hence, we 
construct an index of gender ideology by subtracting support for female breadwinner to support for male 
breadwinner. 3 In so doing, we measure egalitarian gender ideology in the form of support for an equal dual-
earner model when the same score is attributed to both women and men as breadwinners (zero on our index). 
But also deviation from it in the form of a) support for male breadwinner model in the reversed situation, that 
is when the respondents supports men working full-time while having young children but less so women 
(positive scores) or b) support for female breadwinner model when the respondent supports women working 
full-time while having young children, but does not equally support men working full-time in the same 
situation (negative scores). This last option was not anticipated in our theoretical part, it reflects a more 
radical4 position defending women empowerment through support for a greater involvement of women – 
than men – in paid employment thanks to men’s greater engagement in care work. As can be expected, we 
find few respondents who are supportive of the female breadwinner model – thus we recode the lower end of 
our scale to avoid empty cells in our models. We recode all score ranging from -10 to -5 as -5, thus our index 
runs from -5 to +10.5 
In the following models, we insert other predictors which correspond to the two sets of variables 
used to account for women’s political participation and are used as control variables. 
In the second model, we introduce socio-demographic and socio-economic controls (SES model). 
More specifically, we include age and nationality as socio-demographic controls and use education, 
employment status, and financial difficulties as predictors of SES. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 
18 to 34 years old, and nationality is a dichotomous variable coded as one when the respondent holds 
citizenship of the country where she lives and zero otherwise. Education is a three-state categorical variable. 
It includes below secondary education (used as the reference category), secondary education, and tertiary 
education. Regarding the definition of precarious workers, most scholars (Armano and Murgia, 2013; De 
Witte and Näswall, 2003) interpret precariousness as a subjectively perceived condition. Meanwhile it is 
very hard to find a subjectively driven operationalization in the literature, we assume contracts’ 
temporariness as a proxy for job precariousness as most authors do (Bassoli and Monticelli, 2011; Marx and 
Picot, 2013), although we are well aware this may be an oversimplification. Thus employment status 
includes long-term unemployed (used as the reference category) those women actively looking for job in the 
past twelve months, regularly employed – including workers with open-ended contracts who have been 
working in the same workplace in the twelve months preceding the interview and precariously employed 
holding temporary, seasonal or project-based contracts. Finally, financial difficulties are measured with a 
dichotomous variable based on a question asking how difficult it is to cope with one’s current income. 
Financial difficulty is coded as one when the respondent finds it difficult to cope with current income and 
zero otherwise. 
In the third model, we add measures of political resources (Verba et al., 1995), including political 
attitudes (Inglehart and Norris, 2003) and social capital (Engeli et al., 2006). We control for political interest, 
external political efficacy, and internal political efficacy, which are all dichotomous variables. Political 
interest is based on a subjective measure and is coded as one when the respondent says she is interested in 
politics and zero otherwise. External political efficacy is based on a question asking whether individuals like 
the respondent have an influence on politics and is coded as one when the respondent thinks so, zero 
otherwise. Internal political efficacy is measured through a subjective question asking how difficult the 
respondent considers politics to be (Niemi et al., 1991). Moreover, we control for left-right self-placement 
using a self-anchoring 10-point scale recoded into a categorical variable. We consider three states in this 
categorical variable, comparing those who place themselves on the left or on the right to those who did not 
place themselves on either side (no response and center self-placement). Finally, as a measure of social 
capital, we control for associational membership, coded as one when the respondent was a member of one or 
more civil society organizations and zero otherwise. 
In model four, we include two measures of biographical availability, types of relationship and living 
with children (Corrigall-Brown, 2012). The type of relationship is a categorical variable with four states: 
married (reference category), living in a partnership, in a relationship, and single. The measure for children is 
also a dichotomous variable coded as one when the respondent lives with children and zero otherwise. 
We run logistic regressions to predict women’s engagement in political consumerism. We use a 
stepwise approach to test our three hypotheses. The stepwise approach allows us to successively introduce 
the different sets of predictors of women’s political participation. First, we include only gender ideology and 
the city dummies to account for contextual fixed effects. Then, we introduce our control variables to account 
for the strength of gender ideology in predicting political consumerism when controlling for the main 
explanations of women’s participation. Finally, we introduce the interaction term between our measure of 
gender ideology and employment status to test our second hypothesis. The use of the interaction terms is of 
utmost importance to disentangle the relationship between employment status and gender ideology, above all 
to control for the effect of consistency between the two (egalitarian ideology while employed and support for 
male breadwinner while unemployed).  
We present average marginal effects (AME) and predictive margins at representative values to 
facilitate the understanding of our results. Moreover, this allows us to show the substantial effect of gender 
ideology in predicting political consumerism. AME calculates the effect of a move from the lowest to the 
highest category in specific independent variables while holding all other variables at their observed values. 
Here, we calculate the effects of moving from the lowest to the highest scores on both measures of gender 
ideology to show the importance of gender ideology in predicting political consumerism. Furthermore, to 
compare the AME of gender ideology with those of other predictors, we also calculate AME for education 
(as a component of SES) and political resources. In the second step, we plot the effects of support for female, 
male, or dual breadwinner on political consumerism for the three employment statuses using predictive 
margins.  
 
Results 
Turning to the results of our analysis, we first present descriptive statistics on gender ideology among young 
urban women. Then, we discuss the substantial effects of gender ideology in the different steps of our 
logistic regressions and in comparison to other important predictors of political participation. Finally, we 
turn to the different effects of gender ideology depending on the employment status of young women. 
 
  
Figure 1. Gender ideology by employment status 
 
 
 
Figure 1 plots gender ideology by employment status. We first see that the gender ideology of most 
young urban women reflects support for an equal dual-breadwinner model, indeed almost half of all 
respondents are situated on the zero of our index. Interestingly, the percentage of young long-term 
unemployed supporting the equal dual-breadwinner (42.5%) is smaller than that of precariously and 
regularly employed young women (48.6 and 49.8 respectively). This difference is statistically significant as 
assessed with adjusted residuals (-2.78 for this cell). 6 As we move towards support for a male breadwinner 
model (+10 on our scale), we see that young unemployed women are under-represented on score one, quite 
on the contrary they represent higher shares among women found on scores two, three, and ten. At the more 
extreme end of our scale, scoring ten in support for the male breadwinner model, are only few young urban 
women. Nonetheless, this points at a stronger approval of the male breadwinner model among the young 
unemployed women. In addition, the precariously employed women tend to be less in favor of this model 
and slightly more in favor of the female breadwinner (only on the minus one score). Since it is difficult to 
account for differences across groups in this figure, we also use a t-test to compare the means across the 
three groups.7 We find that the mean score for unemployed women is significantly higher than that of 
regularly or precariously employed women, thus confirming more support for the male breadwinner model 
among unemployed women. On the contrary, the average score of the precariously employed young women 
is the lowest, falling closer to the dual-earner model. This suggests that unemployed women hold a less 
egalitarian gender ideology. This finding is important, as it goes in the direction postulated in the second 
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hypothesis (2a). Additionally, the precarious youth hold similar views as the regularly employed young 
women, only slightly more egalitarian, also going in the expected direction—that is, fewer differences 
between regularly and precariously employed youth (hypothesis 2b). 
 
Table 1. Effects of gender ideology in predicting political consumerism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
AME (0/10) 
(5) 
AME (-5/10) 
Main effect of Gender ideology       
From egalitarian to male breadwinner .140*** .109*** .088** .086**   
[.07,.21] [.04,.17] [.03,.15] [.02,.15]   
       
From male breadwinner to female breadwinner .266*** .210** .170** .166**   
[.14,.40] [.08,.34] [.05,.29] [.04,.29]   
Conditional by employment status       
Unemployed women     .007 .014 
     [-.10,.09] [-.21,.18] 
       
Precariously employed women     .174** .349** 
     [.06, 29] [.12, .57] 
       
Regularly employed women     .102+ .204+ 
     [-.01, .21] [-.01,.42,] 
N 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 2019 
pseudo R2 .095 .153 .205 .207 .210 .210 
Source: Appendix 2, model 1 to 5 
We present Average Marginal Effects (AME) calculated when moving from minimum to maximum on our measure of gender 
ideology. In order to facilitate the interpretability of the results, we reversed the scale and we propose two min-max variations, from 
0 to 10 captures changes from support for male breadwinner to support for egalitarianism, but also from -5 to 10 which 
captures changes from support for male breadwinner to support for female-breadwinner. We present also 95 percent 
confidence intervals in brackets. 
Model 1 – Controls included: cities 
Model 2 – Controls included: cities; socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables 
Model 3 – Controls included: cities; socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables; political resources 
Model 4 – Controls included: cities; socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables; political resources; biographical availability 
Model 5 – Controls included: cities; socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables; political resources; biographical availability; 
interaction term between employment status and gender ideology, the change from 0 to 1. 
Model 6 – Controls included: cities; socio-demographic and socioeconomic variables; political resources; biographical availability; 
interaction term between employment status and gender ideology, the change from 0 to 1. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00 
 
Moving to the impact of gender ideology on political behaviors, we look at the first part of Table 1 
(models 1 to 4), which presents the effects of our measure of gender ideology on political consumerism when 
controlling for the different sets of identified predictors. Since our measure of gender ideology is an index 
centered on the egalitarian support for a dual earner model, we calculate two types of Average Marginal 
Effects. The first captures the change when moving from this egalitarian position to support for the 
traditional male breadwinner model. The second captures a more particular spectrum of gender ideologies 
running from male breadwinner to female breadwinner. Thus at both extremes stands support for a division 
of roles related to sex with support for only either female or male full-time employment while having young 
children, at one extreme the traditional male breadwinner model and at the other the more unexpected female 
breadwinner model. 
Starting with the effects of egalitarian dual-earner gender ideology, we see that it increases 
participation in political consumerism. However, the effect is strongest when no controls are included in the 
model except for the city dummies; in this case, the increase reaches 14.0%. When adding the SES variables 
as controls, we see that support for female as breadwinner still increases the probability of engaging in 
political consumerism by 10.9%. However, when we add the next set of controls, that is, political resources, 
support for a dual earner model contributes to the probability of participating by only 8.8%. Finally, in model 
4, measures of biographical availability slightly contribute to the model; there is almost no change in the 
effect of egalitarian gender beliefs. Thus, controlling for the most important predictors of women’s political 
participation, we find that holding a more egalitarian gender ideology measured by support for female 
conciliation contributes to political consumerism, as stated in our first hypothesis.  
Moving to the second set of AME that we calculated for the less common range of gender ideology 
running from support for a male breadwinner model to support for a female breadwinner model, in the lower 
part of Table 2, we see that having this strong stance on women participation in the labor market at the 
expense of men’s involvement in it (female breadwinner model) boosts the probability of participating in 
political consumerism by 26.6%when controlling only for cities. Again, increases in the probability to do 
political consumerism for women who hold these empowering gender ideology is not as strong when we 
further include controls in our model, but remains at 16.6% with all controls included.  
Let us now turn to our second and third hypotheses to determine whether we find different effects 
across employment statuses. To do so, we also present the effects of our measure of gender ideology when 
we include an interaction between gender ideology and employment status (model 5).  
 
  
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of political consumerism. 
 
 
Source: AME are calculated based on Appendix 2, Model 5 (with all controls and interaction terms) 
 
 
Considering our model 5, in Figure 2, we plotted the predicted probabilities of participating in 
political consumerism at the various levels of gender ideology by employment status. This allowed us to see 
the differential effects of gender ideology on the probability of participation for each employment status. 
Figure 2 illustrates the positive effects of supporting a female breadwinner model on the probability of 
participating in political consumerism for regularly and precariously employed young women (the two 
ascending lines with diamonds and triangles that go from the zero reference line to the left-hand side of the 
figure). But we also see, on the right of the reference line, that as regularly and precariously employed 
women are more supportive of a male breadwinner model, their probability to engage in political 
consumerism diminishes. In addition, the plot shows the absence of effect of gender ideology for the long-
term unemployed, as illustrated by the quasi-flat line with dots throughout the figure. Returning to Table 1, 
we see that our first hypothesis holds for regularly employed young women. In fact, for regularly employed 
women, support for egalitarian dual-earner model increases the probability of participating in political 
consumerism by 10.2%when all the other controls are included in the model, although the result is only 
significant at a 10% threshold we see that the confidence intervals only cut marginally the zero line pointing 
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at uncertainty of the estimate (it runs from -0.01 to .21/42). Furthermore, for those who support the female 
breadwinner model it increases by up to 20%. For the precariously employed women, the picture is similar to 
that of regularly employed women, as stated in hypothesis 2b; however, the effect is stronger (17.4 and 
34.9% increase respectively) and there is now more confidence around the statistical estimate. Finally, for 
unemployed women, holding a more egalitarian gender ideology or even favoring a female breadwinner 
model does not have any effect on political consumerism. 
 
Figure 3. Average Marginal Effect of main predictors for each employment status (with 95% Cls). 
 
 
Source: AME are calculated based on Appendix 2, Model 5 (with all controls and interaction terms) 
 
Finally, in Figure 3, we assess the importance of gender ideology in predicting political 
consumerism. More specifically, we compare the AME of our measure of gender ideology to some of the 
most important predictors of political participation. Because we find that the effects of gender ideology differ 
across employment statuses, we present the marginal effect separately for each group. The figure is based on 
our full models, which includes all the controls identified in the literature on women’s political participation. 
Figure 3 nicely shows the variations across groups and, more importantly, the predictive power of gender 
ideology. Gender ideology is among the strongest predictors of participation in political consumerism for 
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both precariously and regularly employed women. The magnitude of gender ideology is similar to, or even 
bigger than, that of tertiary education or political interest, but in the opposite direction. For the long-term 
unemployed women, gender ideology has no effect as can be seen by the fact that the AME is very close to 
the zero line and by the confidence intervals that largely overlap the zero on both ends.  
We also note here that the measure of gender ideology has large confidence intervals that are due to 
measurement uncertainty. Nonetheless, for precariously employed women the negative impact of gender 
ideologies that are supportive of a male breadwinner model is clear. Furthermore, for the regularly employed 
women, the true coefficients of the variables measuring gender beliefs are expected to remain in the negative 
side, the confidence interval only slightly cuts the zero line. This means that we can be confident that the 
more egalitarian the ideology is, the more likely it is that both the regularly and the precariously employed 
women will participate in political consumerism. Surprisingly, we also find that gender ideology has no 
effect on unemployed young women political consumerism 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The main line of inquiry examines the effect of gender ideology on young women’s political consumerism. 
Gender ideology is defined as beliefs that young women hold regarding women’s and men’s involvement in 
paid and care work and is measured with a variable confronting views on female and male involvement in 
paid employment and care work, assessing support for female breadwinner, dual-earner, and male 
breadwinner (Davis and Greenstein, 2009). Our measures allows us to measure egalitarian views when 
young women evaluate in the same way women and men involvement in the labor market while having 
young children, but also to assess for a more empowering view related to a female breadwinner model 
(support for female full-time work while having children, but not for male) or a more traditional support for a 
male breadwinner model (support for male full-time work, but not for female). Following the post-
modernization theory, we hypothesized that women who hold a more egalitarian gender ideology are more 
active in terms of political consumerism than those who hold a more traditional ideology. A second set of 
hypotheses regards the interaction between gender ideology and employment status. We hypothesized that 
long-term unemployed women would hold less egalitarian gender beliefs, which are more congruent with 
their current situation of joblessness, and thus would be less active in political consumerism (hypothesis 2a). 
However, we were unsure about the effects of incongruence and left it open. Finally, we expected that for 
precariously employed women, the effects of gender ideology would be the same as for regularly employed 
ones (hypothesis 2b)  
The results of our multivariate analysis, controlling for the predictors of women’s political 
participation that we identified in the literature on women’s political participation, confirmed hypothesis 1, 
which states that the more egalitarian the women are in their gender ideology, the more likely they are to 
participate in political consumerism. The predictors we use to measure gender ideology contribute to 
predicting young women’s political consumerism. This finding confirms a previous finding by Burns et al. 
(2001) that normative beliefs about the division of work within the household affect political participation. 
However, the effects of gender ideology are much higher than expected because they are comparable to those 
of education or political interest. Thus, gender ideology appears to be an important predictor to consider 
when assessing young women’s participation in political consumerism.  
However, the story is more complex, as anticipated in hypothesis 2a. These effects vary depending 
on one’s employment status. Following the literature (Davis, 2007), we argue that women adapt their gender 
ideology to their current situation to reduce the psychological burden of unemployment. In fact, Bolzendahl 
and Myers (2004) suggest that employment plays an important role in predicting egalitarian gender ideology. 
Indeed, we find that unemployed women tend to be slightly less egalitarian. However, more interestingly, we 
uncover different effects of gender ideology for the employed and the unemployed young women. Although 
in the case of the precariously employed young women, and to some extent for the regularly employed, being 
more egalitarian fosters participation, for the long-term unemployed women, this is not the case.  
Therefore, support for dual-earner models triggers political participation only when it is matched by 
the presence of having a job (standard employment or temporary one). We argue that this is due to coherence 
between women’s belief and their actual situation. In the absence of coherence, we do not find this effect. 
The coherence between personal status and gender ideology induces a political impact. Women without a 
stable income who support the idea of a male breadwinner model are less active than their counterparts. 
However, the behavior of precariously employed young women is the most intriguing finding. In 
particular, we unexpectedly find the highest impact of gender ideology for precariously employed women. 
This finding helps us better understand this job condition that is otherwise similar to standard workers in 
terms of gender beliefs. Thus, these women are able to perceive their working condition as empowering. 
When holding an egalitarian gender belief, they are even more active than employed women holding 
analogous beliefs. On the other hand, when holding a male as breadwinner stance, they translate their job 
condition into a decrease in political activity, considering their income as not being enough. This is in line 
with the idea that there are “small cumulative differences in resources growing out of a host of institutions” 
(Burns, 2007: 111), on the one side, the temporary job condition, and on the other the gender belief per se.  
The main limitations of our study relates to its focus on one form of political participation and the 
use of a unique dataset that allows us to compare three employment statuses but forces us to focus on a 
specific group of women who are young and who live in particular European cities. Further research should 
pursue the analysis of gender ideology on other forms of political participation, beyond political 
consumerism and test it on party activities (still dominated by men) and voting (the most common form of 
participation among both women and men). This would provide a more complete picture of the effects of 
gender ideology on women’s political participation. Better understanding how ideologies related to one’s 
role in society affect political participation would contribute greatly to the study of the determinants of 
political participation. The more we know about the effects of specific stances regarding one’s role in 
society, the better we can understand participation or the lack thereof by different social groups and the roots 
of inequalities in terms of political participation. 
 In addition, our study prompts future research to include gender beliefs in the study of women’s 
political participation more broadly. Future studies could extend this finding by testing it on older women as 
well as on women residing in rural areas. Including women who live outside of the urban context should not 
change our results. However, when working with women living in both urban and rural areas, we might 
expect to find more housewives, who are not included in the sample we use here, and perhaps will also see 
more women holding less egalitarian beliefs due to adaptive strategies or more conservative social 
backgrounds.  
The comparison of three employment statuses showed the relevance of analyzing different forms of 
employment that correspond to contemporary employment trends. The literature on precarious employment 
is a growing field of research, so future research will be able to address more precisely the specific situation 
of precarious workers with regards to political participation. We consider the specific finding on precariously 
employed young women – who benefit most from an egalitarian gender ideology – to be of great relevance 
as it contributes to understanding some specificities of this group who is neither completely included nor 
completely excluded from the labor market. In particular, our finding reveals that precariously employed 
cannot be treated as similar to regularly employed or unemployed youth, they form a specific group which 
should be studied more in-depth. Additionally, future research should be devoted to young women working 
part-time to account for the specific status of women in the labor market. Research on the political 
participation of precariously employed workers remains rather limited, and as more knowledge is gained 
regarding the political behavior of this group, it can be integrated into the study of women’s political 
participation.  
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Notes 
1 Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) find that employment plays an important role in predicting egalitarian gender ideology. 
However, they find mixed results related to currently being out of the labor market. Hence, they cannot conclude 
whether the interest-based (current status) or the exposure-based (having once been employed) explanation best 
accounts for gender ideology. 
2 Questions wording: 1) How much do you approve or disapprove if a woman has a full-time job while she has children 
aged under three? 2) How much do you approve or disapprove if a man has a full-time job while he has children aged 
under three? Respondents are asked to evaluate their degree of agreement on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 
“totally disagree” and 10 “fully agree.” 
3 A Spearman's correlation was run to assess the relationship between “support for female breadwinner” and “support 
for male breadwinner” on the whole sample of 2305 young women. There was a negative correlation which was 
statistically significant, rs = -.425, p = .000. We also calculate the Cronbach alpha to check the internal consistency of 
our measure, it is .56 which is low but considering that we include only two items and that Cronbach alpha increased 
with number of items we consider it acceptable to construct an index. 
4 We use the term radical in the sense of a more drastic or extreme position, not in the sense of radical feminism who 
fought against male supremacy and in favor of equality (see Willis 1984). 
5 The measure of gender ideology is transformed into a 0-1 scale for the inclusion in the logistic regressions. 
6 Details on the distribution can be found in Appendix 3. 
7 More information on means and t-test can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics by employment status. 
 
 Long-term unemployed 
Precariously 
employed 
Regularly 
employed   
 mean SD mean SD mean SD min SD 
Dependent variable         
Political consumerism 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Independent variables         
Gender ideology 1.58 3.02 1.09 2.51 1.25 2.51 -5 10 
Socio-economic           
Age 26.32 4.52 25.85 4.26 27.48 4.02 18 35 
Citizen of the country 0.83 0.37 0.91 0.28 0.89 0.32 0 1 
Education level 1.90 0.64 2.18 0.68 2.15 0.68 1 3 
Financial difficulties 0.35 0.48 0.16 0.36 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Political resources          
Political interest 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Political efficacy 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Political knowledge 0.25 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Left self-placement 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Right self-placement 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 1 
No self-placement 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Associational 
membership 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Biographical availability         
Married 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Living with partner 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.36 0 1 
In a relationship 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Single 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Living with children 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Cities         
Geneva 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Turin 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Cologne 0.22 0.42 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Lyon 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Observations 610  714  695    
 
Appendix 2. Stepwise Logistic Regression on Political Consumerism (Exponentiated coefficients, Standard errors in parenthesis). 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Gender ideology           
Female vs male breadwinner  .200*** (.0812)  .253** (.109)  .301** (.134)  .309** (.138) 1.106 (.789) 
Socioeconomic status           
Employment status (ref. unemployed)           
- Precariously employed   1.427* (.216) 1.321+ (.207) 1.316+ (.208) 5.164** (3.169) 
- Regularly employed    .941 (.147)  .977 (.158)  .981 (.161) 2.421 (1.529) 
Age   1.083*** (.0170) 1.072*** (.0177) 1.081*** (.0193) 1.081*** (.0193) 
Citizen of the country   2.360*** (.453) 1.782** (.364) 1.719** (.356) 1.735** (.359) 
Education level (ref. below secondary)           
Secondary   1.288 (.216) 1.094 (.190) 1.056 (.186) 1.048 (.185) 
Tertiary   2.923*** (.514) 2.105*** (.390) 1.977*** (.374) 1.976*** (.375) 
Financial difficulties   1.354+ (.212) 1.275 (.208) 1.293 (.213) 1.263 (.209) 
Political resources           
Political interest     2.153*** (.273) 2.131*** (.271) 2.162*** (.276) 
Internal political efficacy      .757* (.101)  .760* (.102)  .755* (.101) 
Understands politics     1.330* (.174) 1.346* (.177) 1.340* (.177) 
Left-right position (ref. no position)           
- Left     2.021*** (.284) 2.006*** (.283) 2.010*** (.284) 
- Right     1.028 (.180) 1.051 (.184) 1.071 (.189) 
Associational membership     1.804*** (.251) 1.837*** (.257) 1.845*** (.259) 
Biographical availability           
Civil status (ref. married)           
- Living-in partner       1.088 (.229) 1.093 (.230) 
- In a relationship        .950 (.191)  .968 (.196) 
- Single       1.115 (.209) 1.132 (.213) 
Living with children        .783 (.131)  .790 (.133) 
Interactions terms           
Precarious # Female conciliation          .0855* (.0913) 
Employed # Female conciliation          .202 (.221) 
           
City (Ref. Geneva)           
- Cologne .796+ (.110) .583*** (.092) .501*** (.084) .497*** (.084) .485*** (.082) 
- Lyon .956 (.148) .890 (.153) 1.182 (.220) 1.199 (.225) 1.207 (.227) 
Turin .141*** (.025) .140*** (.028) .155*** (.033) .164*** (.035) .165*** (.035) 
chi2 (degrees of freedom) 21 .8 (4)***  339.5 (11)***  456.5 (17)***  46 .5 (21)***  466.1 (23)***  
N 2019  2019  2019  2019  2019  
AIC 2023.1  1908.5  1803.5  1807.4  1805.8  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix 3. Gender ideology, respondents distribution by employment status (frequencies) 
 
scale Unemployed  
women 
Precariously 
employed 
 women 
Regularly employed 
 women 
All sample 
     
Mean 1.58 1.09 1.25 1.29 
     
-5 2.13 1.68 1.29 1.68 
-4 1.48 0.98 0.86 1.09 
-3 1.15 1.4 1.15 1.24 
-2 2.95 2.52 2.59 2.67 
-1 2.46 4.34 1.44 2.77 
0 42.46 48.6 49.78 47.15 
1 5.08 9.52 9.5 8.17 
2 13.61 9.8 10.07 11.05 
3 9.02 5.74 6.62 7.03 
4 5.25 4.48 5.47 5.05 
5 4.1 4.76 4.6 4.51 
6 2.13 1.96 2.16 2.08 
7 1.97 1.12 1.44 1.49 
8 1.15 1.12 1.01 1.09 
9 1.15 1.12 0.43 0.89 
10 3.93 0.84 1.58 2.03 
Total  100% 100% 100%  
N 610 714 695 2,019 
Note:  
T-test reveals statistically significant differences in the means between unemployed and other (p= .001), precarious and others (p= 
.012), but not between employed and the other two groups (p= .606). 
Chi-square test (p= .001) and adjusted residuals are used to signal important differences in the expected counts in the different cells, 
bold used for high than expected (AR larger than 1.96) and underscore for lower 
